RABS: Rule-Based Adaptive Batch Steganography by Hedieh Sajedi
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
  
3 
RABS: Rule-Based  
Adaptive Batch Steganography  
Hedieh Sajedi 
Department of Computer Science, Tehran University,  
Iran 
1. Introduction 
Steganography is used mostly when the fact of communicating needs to be kept covert. This 
is carried out by embedding the secret data in apparently innocuous covers. Typical covers 
are image, video, and audio files (Munuera, 2007). For steganographic systems, the major 
requirement is that the stego object should be perceptually and statistically 
indistinguishable to the degree that it does not raise suspicion. In other words, the hidden 
information should impose slight or undetectable modification to the cover objects (Wu & 
Shih, 2006).  
The steganography methods that embed secret data in Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) of 
images are well known because of the vast usage of JPEG images. Steganography methods 
like F5 (Westfeld,2001), Model-based (MB) (Sallee, 2003), Perturbed Quantization (PQ) 
(Fridrich et al. 2004), and YASS (Solanki et al. 2007) manipulate some DCT coefficients for 
embedding the secret data. Some other methods have been proposed which embed secret 
information in other transform domains, such as Contourlet-based steganography method 
(Sajedi & Jamzad, 2008) that hides secret data in contourlet coefficients of a cover image. 
Stego version of images may have different grades of visual and statistical undetectability 
due to their different contents. It is shown in (Wu & Shih, 2006) that, when the size of 
hidden data gets larger than a threshold then it becomes easier for a steganalysis algorithm 
to detect the presence of the hidden data. Consequently, a steganography method can 
employ a technique to embed in a cover image until it does not attract the attention of 
steganalysis methods and makes steganalyzers to misclassify the observed stego image as a 
cover (clean) image. In this way, we can find an upper bound for embedding rate such that 
if the size of hidden data is less than that upper bound, the stego image is safe and it can not 
be detected by steganalysis methods.  
So far, the performance of a steganography method is evaluated in its average 
steganography capacity. However, there is no guarantee that a specific stego image could 
not be detected reliably by the steganalyzers. In this chapter, we propose an approach to 
estimate the steganography capacity of images. Then, the steganographer can embed 
securely a secret data with the size smaller than or equal to the steganography capacity of 
the image.  
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In investigating the problem from a theoretical model, in order to obtain the actual results, 
the statistical models of images should be simplified to an extent that would cause the 
results less relevant. Instead of using statistical models, we extract the signature of cover 
images as a practical model for images and evaluate the security of stego images with 
respect to this model.  
The usual concept of steganography assumes that the steganographer embeds the secret 
data in only one cover image and passes it on to the recipient by means of a communication 
channel. Since the steganography capacity of an image is limited (Fridrich et al. ,2007), to 
hide a large secret data securely, we have to split the secret data to some parts and embed 
each part in a cover image. Consequently, the large secret data is hidden in a set of cover 
images and the resulted set of stego images is passed through the communication channel. 
This technique is called Batch steganography, which is first proposed by Ker (Ker, 2006). He 
states in (Ker, 2008) that in batch steganography, the best choice for the steganographer is to 
spread the secret data equally between cover images. This statement is due to the 
assumptions considered to simplify the theoretical presentation of batch steganography.  
In (Sajedi& Jamzad, 2009) to describe the problem in batch steganography, we called the 
Ker’s definition of batch steganography as Static Batch Steganography (SBS). SBS divides the 
secret data into some parts of equal size and embeds each part in a cover image separately 
(Ker, 2006; Ker, 2008). Since in SBS the steganographer embeds in cover images blindly 
without considering the differences between various cover images, two problems may be 
occurred. First, the steganographer may embed in an image less than its steganography 
capacity. In this case, the steganographer has not used the steganography capacity of the 
image efficiently. The second problem occurs when the steganographer hides secret data in 
an image while the size of secret data is larger than the steganography capacity of image. 
Consequently, the security of the resulted stego image is reduced. In fact, SBS assumes 
identical steganography capacity for each cover image independent of its content. In SBS, a 
small part of secret data is embedded in each image so as the security of the produced stego 
image is not threatened.  
Previously, we proposed an adaptive batch steganography called ABS in (Sajedi& Jamzad, 
2009). In this method, an ensemble of steganalyzers determines the steganography 
capacity of images and then the secret data is divided based on the steganography 
capacity of cover images. In (Sajedi& Jamzad, 2009), the estimation time of steganography 
capacity is rather high because the feature extraction part of steganalyzers, which are used 
in the ensemble steganalyzer, is done completely. As we know, the feature extraction part 
of each steganalyzer is the most time-consuming part of it. Consequently, in this chapter 
we tend to reduce the estimation time of steganography capacity in adaptive batch 
steganography.  
We propose Rule-based Adaptive Batch Steganography (RABS) in which we estimate the 
steganography capacity of each image according to the signature of clean images. Therefore, 
instead of embedding a constant amount of data in each image as Ker proposed, we embed 
unequal amounts of secret data in each image reliant to its steganography capacity. RABS is 
an intelligent solution to the problem of hiding a large secret data and it guaranties the 
security of stego images against the existing steganalyzers.  
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On the other hand, since the communication channel is limited, we prefer to have the lowest 
number of images in the stego image set to occupy the communication channel lesser. RABS 
attempts to decrease the number of required cover images by applying an intelligent cover 
selection approach. In this approach, to hide a large secret data we split the payload and 
embed each part in an image with steganography capacity of equal or higher than the secret 
data part.  
Generally, in batch steganography by considering the steganography capacity of images, the 
steganographer can embed securely every large-size secret data in a set of images, which are 
selected to have a sufficient total steganography capacity. In RABS, for embedding a secret 
data with a certain size, the database is checked and a set of proper cover images is 
suggested for embedding. This strategy can be used with any existing steganography 
methods. 
In this chapter, steganography capacity of images is estimated by extracting and using the 
signature of clean images. Our approach first analyzes an image database to discover the 
signature of clean images. By the signature, we mean the effective features of clean images 
and their relative values. This signature is a set of fuzzy if-then rules that represents 
similarity between clean images. A secure stego image is the one that after data hiding 
stimulates the generated fuzzy rules significantly and follows the signature of clean images. 
The process of generating the signature of clean images is done by an Evolutionary 
Algorithm (EA). EA have been used as rule induction and optimization tools in design of 
fuzzy rule-based systems (Cordon et al. 2009, Hu et al. 2003).  
We considered steganography capacity measure in applying MB, PQ, and YASS 
steganography techniques and validated it using an image database. The results illustrate 
that embedding in cover images based on their steganography capacity reduces the 
detection accuracy of state-of-the-art steganalysis methods considerably compared to the 
traditional usage of the steganography methods. In addition, we used RABS for hiding some 
large secret data in cover image sets and compared the results with ABS and SBS. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the related works. 
RABS method is presented in Section 3. Steganography capacity estimation based on 
signature of clean images is described in Section 4. We explain the experimental results in 
Section 5. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 6. 
2. Related works 
2.1 Batch steganography 
Batch steganography is hiding the secret data into multiple cover objects. It seems that 
considering a fixed secret data length, the embedding in many cover objects will reduce the 
embedding rate for each image and thus make the detection harder. Moreover, a recent 
paper by Fridrich (Fridrich et al. ,2007) highlights the fact that whatever the steganography 
algorithm, it remains highly detectable when the embedding rate is above a threshold (0.05 
bits per non-zero DCT coefficients). The use of small embedding rates provided by batch 
steganography seems attractive in this sense. Ker in (Ker, 2006) takes the main following 
assumptions about the batch steganography process: 
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- The number of cover objects is fixed. 
- All cover objects have the same steganography capacity. 
- The data to embed is of fixed length.  
- The number of cover objects is known to the steganalyzer. 
Additionally, Ker in (Ker, 2008) states that the best choice of the steganographer is to spread 
payload equally between covers. As discussed in (Ker, 2006), some of these assumptions are 
taken in order to establish a proper theoretical framework for the unexplored subject of 
batch steganography. However, these assumptions may not be totally applicable to a 
practical case. For example, if the number of cover images is low and the total capacity of 
cover images is not enough to conceal the secret data, then each resulted stego image is 
overloaded, and its security would be low. If the number of cover images is high, with 
spreading the secret data equally between cover images, then the security of stego images is 
high but the communication channel will be occupied a lot. 
2.2 Steganography capacity 
A number of ways to compute the steganography capacity have been proposed previously 
(Chandramouli, & Memon , 2003- Sajedi & Jamzad,2009a). A definition of steganography 
capacity is presented in (Chandramouli & Memon,2003) from a steganalysis perspective. 
This work argues that as the main goal of steganography is hidden communications, 
steganography capacity is dependent on the type of steganalysis detector employed to break 
the embedding algorithm. It defines γ-security so that in presence of a steganalysis detector 
D, a steganography algorithm is said to be perfectly secure if γD = 0.  
The work in (Cachin, 1998) defines a steganography method to be ε-secure (ε ≥ 0) if the 
relative entropy between the cover and the stego probability distributions (Pc and Ps, 
respectively) is at most ε, i.e., 
 ( ) log cc s c
s
P
D P P P
P
   (1) 
A stego technique is said to be perfectly secure if ε = 0. This definition assumes that the 
cover and stego images are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. 
This assumption is not true for many real life cover signals (Chandramouli & Memon,2003). 
One approach to rectify this is to put the constraint that the relative entropy computed using 
the nth order joint probability distributions must be less than εn. One can then force a 
steganography technique to preserve the n order distribution. But, it may then be possible to 
use (n+1) order statistics for steganalysis. The research in (Moulin & Mihcak, 2002) provides 
an estimate of steganography capacity of images, based on a parallel Gaussian model. 
Ker in (Ker, 2007) defines batch steganography capacity and theoretically proves that the 
size of secret data can safely increase no faster than square root of the number of cover 
images.  
In (Sajedi & Jamzad,2009a), an ensemble system that uses different steganalyzer units, 
considers the steganography capacity by determining the security limits for embedding in 
cover images. In this system, each steganalyzer unit is formed by a combination of multiple 
 
RABS: Rule-Based Adaptive Batch Steganography 
 
39 
steganalyzers from the same type. Each steganalyzer in a steganalyzer unit is trained to 
detect stego images with a certain payload. The upper bound of embedding rate for an 
image is determined based on the confidence of all the steganalyzers about the image. In 
fact, considering steganography capacity, the steganographer can minimize the risk of 
detection by selecting from a database a proper cover image that is secure for a certain 
payload. To calculate the steganography capacity of an image, the embedding rate is 
increased steadily until the security of the produced stego image is threatened by the 
ensemble steganalyzer. The time (t) required for secure embedding (Sajedi & Jamzad,2009a) 
is shown by equation (2):  
s scet t t    
 sce
t
= 
1
( ( ))
I
s su
i
k t t i

  ; 
1
( ) ( )
k
i
su sz
j
t i t j

  (2) 
where scet  is the time of steganography capacity estimation, st is the embedding time of 
employed steganography method, k is the number of iterations of incremental embedding 
algorithm and ( )sut i  is the time of the ith steganalyzer unit. I is the number of steganalysis 
units that are used in the ensemble steganalyzer and ( )iszt j  is the time required for the jth 
steganalyzer that is trained for detection of stego images with payload of multiple j in the ith 
steganalyzer unit. Although the time complexity of secure embedding (Sajedi & 
Jamzad,2009a) is more than traditional embedding, but since it provides more secure stego 
images, its time complexity can be acceptable. Due to differences in contents of various 
images, the total time of incremental embedding may differ. Considering the fact that the 
main goal of steganography is to embed the secret data securely and if any of the 
steganalyzers gets suspicious, then the purpose of steganography is broken, therefore it is 
worth to spend further time to make stego images more secure. 
In this chapter, the evolutionary rule induction algorithm, which is proposed in (Sajedi & 
Jamzad,2009b) is employed. The generated fuzzy rule base is used to form the signature of 
clean images and afterward to estimate the steganography capacity of images.  
2.3 RABS: Rule-based Adaptive Batch Steganography  
Considering steganography capacity of an image, we can embed in the image a portion of 
secret data that its size is less or equal to the steganography capacity of the image. The 
remaining unconcealed portion of secret data can be hidden in some other cover images. 
Our approach aims to improve the undetectability of stego images while utilizing the cover 
images perfectly. Additionally, RABS tries to hide a large secret data in a cover image set 
very quickly. Differing from the static batch steganography (Cachin, 1998; Cordon et al. 
2009), a more practical approach is used in this chapter which its details and procedure is 
described in the following. Our assumptions are as follows: 
1. The steganographer has the option to select cover images from an image database. 
2. The size of secret data can be variable. 
3. The number of cover images in a cover image set can be variable. 
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4. The receiver knows the strategy of steganographer for breaking the payload into some 
parts and the order of stego images. 
The steganographer can select cover images randomly from the database or based on their 
steganography capacities to minimize the detection rate and the number of images in the 
stego image set. In RABS, at first the steganography capacity of cover images is estimated 
using ‘Signature of Clean Images’ (which is described in the next section) and then the 
embedding algorithm is activated. 
The following steps demonstrate the embedding algorithm of RABS approach. Let CI 
denotes the steganography capacity of image I and EDS denotes the size of embedding 
secret data. The inputs of the algorithm are SDS, IDB, and CIS that respectively denotes 
secret data size, image database, and signature of clean images. The output of the algorithm 
is SIS, which denotes the stego image set. 
Step 1.  Select cover image I from IDB and set EDS=0. 
Step 2.  Hide portions of secret data incrementally until the image deviates from CIS. The 
size of data that is embedded in the image shows the steganography capacity CI of 
image I . Set EDS= EDS + CI . 
Step 3.  Add the stego image to SIS. 
If SDS > EDS then  
Select a new cover image from IDB to embed the remaining part of the secret data. 
Go to step 2.  
Otherwise,  
SIS is the output. 
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of steganography capacity estimation. In RABS, 
embedding is continuing in different cover images until the secret data become concealed 
completely. Steganographer can select cover images in random or based on a cover selection 
criterion. To reduce the number of images in stego image set, the steganographer can 
employ a cover selection strategy and choose cover images with higher steganography 
capacities. The image that is the output of the incremental embedding routine is a secure 
stego image because it conceals a part of secret data that its size is not more than the 
steganography capacity of the image.  
3. Steganography capacity estimation 
3.1 Signature extraction of clean images 
In this chapter, we utilize an iterative evolutionary fuzzy algorithm for estimation of 
steganography capacity of images. In this utilization, the algorithm extracts a fuzzy rule 
base for obtaining the signature of clean images. Consequently, to have a secure covert 
communication, we can embed in an image until it deviates from the clean images signature. 
It should be noted that the embedding procedure could be carried on by any steganography 
method.  
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It is generally believed that a blind steganalyzer trained on sufficiently many diverse 
steganography algorithms will become universal in the sense that it will generalize to 
previously unseen (novel) steganography methods. While this is a partially correct 
statement if the embedding mechanism of the novel method resembles some of the 
methods on which the classifier was trained (Pevny & Fridrich, 2008), it demonstrated 
that if the classifier is presented with stego images produced by a completely different 
embedding mechanism, it may fail to detect the images as stego even for an easily 
detectable method. Motivated by this observation, (Pevny & Fridrich, 2008) explored two 
approaches for construction of universal steganalyzers—one-class and one-against-all 
classifiers. One-against-all classifiers may fail on previously unseen stego algorithms. 
One-class methods are less likely to fail to detect unknown stego algorithms. Considering 
the above discussion, to have more generalization capability and to cover unseen 
steganography methods, we model clean images instead of stego images according to the 
method shown in Figure 1. 
The process of extracting steganographic features from an image is a mapping : df C 
from the space of all the covers, C , to a d-dimensional feature space. In steganalysis, 
learning methods are used to find a distinguishing statistics : dS   , on which a 
threshold is set to classify images to the classes of cover and stego (Pevny et al., 2009).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The block diagram of steganography capacity estimation, (a) Extracting signature of 
clean images by evolutionary fuzzy rule induction, (b) Steganography capacity estimation 
by incremental embedding. 
In our current problem we seek a function 1: d nR   revealing the signature of clean 
images (i.e. significant features with their values for cover images), where R  demonstrates 
fuzzy rules and n d .  
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The signature of clean images   ( , ) , , {1,..., } {1,..., }d nj i i i iCIS R x y x y L i l j J       is a 
set of j fuzzy rules with length of i and L  includes linguistic fuzzy values. Following 
subsections describe the details of this approach. 
3.2 Feature extraction 
We use the feature vector  , {1,...,di iX x x i d    , which is produced by appending the 
features of four efficient and well-known steganalyzers. 636 features are computed 
according to the features of Pevny-Fridrich (Pevný & Fridrich, 2007), Chen et. al (Chen et. al, 
2006), Lyu-Farid (Lyu & Farid, 2002), and Li et. al (Li et. Al, 2008) steganalysis methods. In 
the following, we briefly review the features used by these steganalyzers. 
1. Pevny and Fridrich (Pevný & Fridrich, 2007) extract 274 features by merging 193 
extended DCT features with 81 averaged calibrated Markov features. However, many 
of the 274 features may be highly correlated to each other. In this method, Markov 
features model intra block DCT dependencies and DCT features model inter block 
relations. In the rest of this chapter, we refer to this steganalysis method as 274-dim 
steganalyzer.  
2. In (Chen et. al, 2006), Chen et. al proposed a steganalysis method that employs a 324-
dimensional feature vector for analysis. It is based on statistical moments derived from 
both image 2-D array and JPEG 2-D array. This steganalyzer considers both the first 
order and the second order histograms. Consequently, the moments of 2-D 
characteristic functions are also used for steganalysis. In the following, this method is 
referred to as 324-dim steganalyzer.  
3. Wavelet-based steganalysis method (Lyu & Farid, 2002), presented by Lyu and Farid, 
builds a model for clean images by using higher order statistics, and then shows the 
deviation of stego images from the constructed model. Quadratic Mirror Filters are 
used to decompose the image into wavelet domain, after which higher order statistics 
such as mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis are calculated for each subband. The 
higher order statistics are calculated from wavelet coefficients of each high-frequency 
subband to form one group of features. Another group of features is similarly 
formulated from the prediction errors of wavelet coefficients of each high-frequency 
subband. We called this method WBS steganalyzer. 
4. Yet Another Steganographic Scheme (YASS) (Solanki et al. 2007) is designed to be a 
secure JPEG steganographic algorithm. Attacking YASS is proposed in Li et. al (Li et. 
Al, 2008). The success of YASS is attributed to its innovation in embedding, i.e., hiding 
data in embedding cover blocks whose locations are randomized. However, the 
locations of the embedding host blocks are not randomized enough. Some locations in 
an image are possible to hold an entire embedding cover block and some locations are 
definitely not. Additionally, YASS employs a Quantization Index Modulation 
embedding strategy in order to enhance the robustness of the embedded data, which on 
the other hand introduces extra zero coefficients into the embedding cover blocks 
during data hiding. Consequently, statistical features extracted from locations, which 
are possible to hold embedding cover blocks are different from those locations, which 
are impossible to hold embedding cover blocks. Here we called this method YASS-
steganalyzer. 
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Table 1 depicts the types of all the 636 features.  
 
Feature 
Group 
Number of 
Features 
Feature Type 
274 
11 Global Histogram 
66 5 AC Histograms 
99 11 Dual Histograms 
1 Variation 
2 Blockiness 
25 Co-occurrence Matrix 
81 Markov Features 
   
324 
39 Histogram of Spatial Representation and Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT) Representation. 
39 Histogram of Prediction Error and DWT of Error 
39 Histogram of JPEG Representation and its DWT. 
78 Horizontal 2-D Histogram of JPEG Representation and its 
DWT 2-D Histogram 
78 Vertical 2-D Histogram of JPEG Representation and its DWT 
2-D Histogram 
78 Diagonal 2-D Histogram of JPEG Representation and its 
DWT. 
39 Histogram obtained from Prediction Error of JPEG 
representation and its DWT 
   
24 24 Higher order statistics of each Wavelet subband. 
   
14 14 
A group of frequencies of zero rounded re-quantized DCT 
coefficients. 
Table 1. Types of 636 image features  
3.3 Fuzzy rule induction 
We code every fuzzy if-then rule as a string and use the following symbols for denoting the 
six linguistic values: 1: don’t care (DC), 2: small (S), 3: medium small (MS), 4: medium (M), 
5: medium large (ML), 6: large (L). The fuzzy rules are as follows:  
 jRule R : If ( 1x  is 1y  and … and nx  is ny ) then Image is clean with jCF CF . 
where jR  is the label of the jth fuzzy if-then rule,  di ix x    are the features extracted 
from the observed image,  | ni iy y L are linguistic values that represent S, MS, M, ML, L, 
and DC. jCF  is the certainty grade of fuzzy if-then rule jR . Each fuzzy rule has a certainty 
grade that demonstrates the confidence of the rule about its antecedent part. 
The membership function of each linguistic value is specified by homogeneously 
partitioning the domain of each feature into symmetric triangular fuzzy sets. The total 
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number of possible fuzzy if-then rules is 6d (due to using six linguistic values) in case of d-
dimensional feature vector. It is impossible to use all the 6d fuzzy if-then rules in a single 
fuzzy rule base for large d (e.g. steganography capacity estimation based on d = 636 
features). Therefore, the employed evolutionary method searches for a relatively small 
number of fuzzy if-then rules (e.g., J = 10 rules) with higher performance. By performance, 
we mean that the inducted fuzzy if-then rules should be able to show the pattern or 
signature of clean images with high accuracy. This signature is extracted according to the 
training samples of clean and stego images. 
The outline of the employed evolutionary fuzzy method is presented in (Sajedi & 
Jamzad,2009b). We apply the following three steps to calculate the certainty grade of each 
fuzzy if-then rule: 
Step 1:  Calculate the compatibility of each training sample 1 2( , ,... , )p p p pnX x x x  with the 
fuzzy if-then rule jR  by the following product operation: 
 1 1( ) ( ) . . . ( ),j p j p jl plX x x      1,2, ,P M
l n
 
  (3) 
where ( )j i p ix  is the membership function of ith feature of pth sample and M denotes the 
total number of samples. 
Step 2:  For clean and stego images, calculate the relative sum of the compatibility grades of 
training samples with fuzzy if-then rule jR : 
 
( )
( )
p
j p
X Clean
Clean j
Clean
X
R
N

 

 (4) 
 
( )
( )
p
j p
X Stego
Stego j
Stego
X
R
N

 

 (5) 
where ( )Clean jR and ( )Stego jR are the relative sum of the compatibility grades of training 
samples that represent clean and stego images, respectively. Note that CleanN  and StegoN
represent the number of clean and stego images that are being used as training samples.  
Step 3: The grade of certainty jCF  is determined as follows: 
 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
Clean j Stego j
j
Clean j Stego j
R R
CF
R R
 
 
   (6) 
The employed evolutionary fuzzy algorithm learns fuzzy if-then rules by optimizing one 
fuzzy rule in each iteration of the algorithm. At first, all the training samples have the same 
weight and each individual in the algorithm is initialized by the feature vector of an image. 
In each iteration of the algorithm, the rule with highest fitness is considered as the output of 
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the iteration. Then the learning mechanism reduces the weight of those training samples 
that are learned correctly. Samples with higher weight are more significant in the training 
process. Therefore, the next rule induction cycle, searches for fuzzy rules that cover the 
training samples, which are uncovered by the rules obtained in previous iterations. In brief, 
the fuzzy rules that cover the training samples more than other rules are included in the 
final rule base.  
Reducing the weight of training samples helps to aggregate different disciplines between 
features of training samples to form a perfect fuzzy rule base. In the above learning 
framework, we have used a fitness function in evolutionary process. It is computed 
according to equations (7) to (9). 
 
( )
j
k
k
k
R k
X Clean
P k
X Clean
w X
f
w





  (7) 
 
( )
j
k
k
k
R k
X Stego
N k
X Stego
w X
f
w





  (8) 
 ( )j P P N Nfitness R w f w f   (9) 
where, Pf  is the rate of positive training samples covered by rule jR (correctly covered), Nf  
is the rate of negative training samples covered by rule jR  (wrongly covered),
kw is a weight 
which reflects the frequency of the sample kX in the training database, Pw is the weight of 
rule’s positive power, and Nw  is the weight of rule’s negative power.  
Each stego image database and clean image database are shown to the rule induction 
algorithm (we set the parameters of MB, PQ, and YASS to construct stego image databases 
with variety of payloads). Afterward, a clean image rule set is resulted considering the 
effects of a steganography method on images. We have three types of stego image databases 
(MB, PQ, and YASS), therefore, three sets of rules are inducted. Putting all the rules of clean 
images in a clean image rule base, we obtain the signature of clean images. 
3.4 Determining steganography capacity of an image 
To determine the steganography capacity of an image an incremental embedding routine is 
applied. It steadily increases embedding rate until the stego image does not move away 
from the signature of clean images. Figure 1(b) illustrates the block diagram of incremental 
embedding routine.  
For a given rule base S, in order to determine steganography capacity of an image with feature 
vector Xp = (xp1, xp2, …, xpn ) is reliable to host a secret data, two parameters Clean and Stego are 
computed using equations (10) and (11). After hiding the secret data in the cover image, Stego is 
computed based on the features Xps = (xps1, xps2, …, xpsn ) of the produced stego image. 
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 ( )
j
Clean j p j
R S
X CF 

   (10) 
 ( )
j
Stego j ps j
R S
X CF 

   (11) 
Generally, equation (12) is valid for a pair of clean and stego images because the rule base S 
contains rules that are achieved from with regard to clean images. Consequently, a clean 
image is more compatible with these rules compared to its stego version. If , the difference 
of Clean and Stego, is lower than threshold T in equation (13), it means that the clean and stego 
images are not distinguishable and the security of the cover image is acceptable. Since we 
can say that a clean image is a stego image with hidden data size of zero, so for a cover 
image Clean is equal to Stego. While embedding in the image steadily and examining its 
features with the signature of clean images, Stego decreases and so the value of  increases 
little by little. Thus, for determining the steganography capacity of an images we embed in 
the image incrementally until  < T. Finally, the steganography capacity of the images is 
equal to the size of embedded data. 
 Clean Stego   (12) 
 ( )
Clean Stego
T      (13) 
Considering capacity limit in steganography, the steganographer can embed in an image 
until the stego image is undetectable. To produce a secure stego image, the secret data is 
embedded in the image and the resulted stego image is evaluated according to the signature 
of clean images. If the stego image deviates from the signature significantly, the cover image 
is overloaded and the steganographer can reduce the payload.  
4. Experiments 
For signature extraction of clean images, we used Camera image database of Binghamton 
University (Cancelli et.al ,2008), which has 3164 grayscale images of size 512×512. To 
evaluate the performance of RABS approach, we obtained 1000 JPEG images from both 
Washington University image database (washington.edu) and Internet. All images are 
converted to grayscale and cropped to size of 512×512.  
In this chapter, we measure the separation of feature vectors of cover and stego images by 
training a non-linear SVM classifier with RBF kernel and use the accuracy of steganalysis 
as a measure of detectability (Fridrich et.al ,2007). Detection accuracy being close to 50 
implies nearly undetectable hiding, and as the detectability improves, detection accuracy 
increases towards 100. To make stego image databases, MB, PQ, and YASS steganography 
methods are employed. We set the parameters of these methods to different values to 
obtain three stego image databases with variety of payloads. Each stego database has 1000 
stego images. 
Our experiments were executed on a personal computer with a 2046 MB PIV processor 
using Matlab R2007.  
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In our implementation environment, the average time for incremental embedding in one 
image and determining the steganography capacity of the image is around 20 seconds. This 
time is around 2 minutes when the ABS is employed (Cordon et.al ,2004). As the result 
shows, RABS is less time-consuming than ABS. Therefore, using RABS a large secret data 
can be hidden in a cover image set more quickly compared to ABS. Since secure data 
embedding is the main goal of steganography and if any of the steganalyzers gets 
suspicious, the purpose of steganography is broken, it is worth to spend more time to make 
stego images more secure. 
4.1 Performance of RABS  
RABS can apply every existing steganography method. Table 2 shows the detection 
accuracy of four steganalyzers on the proposed RABS, ABS, and the traditional usage of PQ, 
MB, and YASS steganography methods. Employing WBS, 274-dim, 324-dim, and YASS 
steganalysis (denoted by YASS analyzer in the table) methods, to train the SVM classifier of 
each steganalyzer, 1200 (600 clean and 600 stego) images from the image database were 
used. The remaining 800 images are used for testing. As we see in Table 2, the results 
obviously show that the stego images, which are produced by RABS, are less detectable than 
the stego images constructed by traditional usage of steganography methods. In providing 
security for stego images, RABS approach operates close to ABS.  
It should be noted that in ABS, the steganography capacity of an image is determined 
without considering the steganalysis method of YASS. 
Figure 2 shows the average accuracy of steganalyzers in detection of stego images with 
different payloads produced by traditional usage of steganography methods, ABS, and 
RABS. In most of the cases, ABS’ and RABS’ undetectability are very close to each other. 
Both, ABS and RABS produce stego images with much higher security than traditional 
usage of steganography methods.  
 
Steganography 
method 
Average
Payload
(bits) 
Steganalysis detection accuracy (%) 
Traditional 
steganography method 
ABS RABS 
WBS
274-
dim
324-
dim
YASS 
analyzer
WBS
274-
dim
324-
dim
YASS 
analyzer
WBS
274-
dim 
324-
dim 
YASS 
analyzer 
PQ 
2000 72 74 57 - 53 53 52 - 55 56 53 - 
6000 76 77 83 - 55 58 56 - 56 58 58 - 
10000 79 79 91 - 56 60 59 - 59 61 60 - 
MB 
2000 71 67 89 - 51 54 59 - 51 54 54 - 
6000 77 72 96 - 56 52 56 - 56 52 56 - 
10000 86 81 99 - 56 57 58 - 59 60 59 - 
YASS 
2000 55 57 59 72 52 56 57 72 52 55 55 56 
6000 62 63 57 86 56 58 57 86 59 59 57 61 
10000 61 69 65 97 59 60 59 97 59 60 59 65 
Table 2. Accuracy of steganalysis methods in detection of stego images produced by 
different steganography methods (in percent  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 2. Average detection accuracy of steganalysis methods on (a) PQ, (b) MB, and (c) YASS 
steganography methods.  
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Figure 4 shows the relationship between the number of members in a cover image set and 
the total steganography capacity of it. White columns are computed by square root law, as 
described by Ker et al. in (Ker, 2007). Light gray columns show the average capacity of the 
cover image sets when their members are selected randomly. Dark gray and black columns 
show the average capacity of the cover image sets when their members are selected using 
ABS and RABS respectively from images having top 40% higher capacity in the database. As 
the Figure 4 shows, random selection columns are close to the square root law columns. In 
square root law, we suppose that cover images have equal steganography capacities. 
However, selection of cover images based on steganography capacity (as suggested by ABS 
and RABS methods) breaks this law.  
 
Fig. 3. Relationship between the number of images in cover image sets and total 
steganography capacity of them when the cover images are selected in random, using ABS, 
or RABS comparing to square toot law that shows the total steganography capacity in 
theory.  
Figure 3 implies that the square root law of steganographic capacity that is true 
theoretically, is not always true in practice. We observed that the steganography capacity of 
a cover image set is approximately a constant, which is multiplied by the number of cover 
images in the set. In square root law, increasing the number of cover images in a set has a 
slight influence in total capacity of it. In both ABS and RABS approaches, the total 
steganography capacity of an image set is approximately the sum of the steganography 
capacity of all its members.  
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5. Conclusions  
We investigated batch steganography, which is hiding secret data in more than one cover 
images. This chapter proposes a new adaptive batch steganography approach for hiding a 
large secret data in multiple cover images by defining and using the steganography 
capacity of images. Images have various properties due to their different contents. 
Therefore, for a certain size secret data they could result in stego images with unequal 
degree of undetectability. In this chapter, we proposed a novel approach to estimate the 
steganography capacity of images based on signature of clean images, which is achieved 
by analyzing the similarity between features of cover images. In this regard, an 
evolutionary fuzzy algorithm is employed to induct fuzzy if-then rules from features of 
clean images and form the signature of clean images. After discovering the signature of 
clean images, in the next step, the steganographer can selects the proper cover images 
from the database. A proper cover image is the one that after embedding, its effective 
features do not deviate from the signature of clean images. According to the obtained 
results, our approach reduces the detection rate of steganalyzers compared to the 
traditional use of steganography methods. The advantage of our proposed approach is 
that in appearance of new steganalyzer methods, the fuzzy rule base can be upgraded and 
thus the signature of clean images can become more trustable. By employment of our 
proposed RABS, one can hide a large secret data securely and quickly in an image set with 
the least number of images.  
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